# Postpositivism

> Empirical inquiry can pursue objectivity while accepting fallible evidence, theory-laden observation, and the influence of values.

- HTML version: https://robbiepalmer.me/ideas/postpositivism
- Source: https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/postpositivism-and-educational-research-9780847691227/

Postpositivism is a family of views that retains empirical inquiry while
rejecting the hope for theory-free observation or certain foundations. It
treats knowledge as fallible, methods as open to criticism, and objectivity as
something inquiry works towards rather than a view from nowhere.

The label covers thinkers who disagree about realism, explanation, method, and
scientific progress. It is therefore better understood as a broad response to
positivism than as one doctrine with a fixed checklist. Karl Popper's critical
rationalism, Thomas Kuhn's historical account of science, and later work on the
social organisation of criticism contribute different parts of that response.

## What changes after positivism

Logical positivists sought a firm relation between meaningful scientific claims
and observation. Postpositivist accounts challenge the clean separation behind
that programme.

[Theory-ladenness](/ideas/theory-ladenness) shows that an observation depends on
assumptions about instruments, categories, and relevance. The
[Duhem-Quine problem](/ideas/falsifiability#a-test-examines-a-bundle) shows that a
failed prediction tests a connected set of claims rather than one hypothesis in
isolation. Kuhn's work adds history and scientific communities: standards,
exemplary problems, and even some concepts can change through a
[paradigm shift](/ideas/paradigm-shift).

These arguments rule out a mechanical path from raw data to final truth. They do
not rule out learning from experience. Evidence can still surprise us, expose
errors, and favour one account over another. The judgement remains revisable.

## Objectivity without neutrality

Postpositivism does not require the claim that every account is equally good.
Methods can make some errors easier to find. Clear procedures, independent
checks, risky tests, replication, and public criticism give claims more chances
to fail for a reason that others can inspect.

Values enter before a result is interpreted. They affect which questions are
asked, which effects count as harmful, what threshold is acceptable, and whose
experience is recorded. Pretending those decisions are absent hides them from
criticism. Stating them allows others to test how much the conclusion depends on
them.

Consider a town deciding where to place a pedestrian crossing. Counts of foot
traffic and collisions matter, but neither number chooses the policy on its own.
The study must decide when to count, how to treat near misses, and how to weigh
speed against access for people who avoid the dangerous road. A postpositivist
approach does not discard the counts. It documents those decisions, seeks
missing observations, compares explanations, and leaves the recommendation
open to revision.

## A working stance

The useful core of postpositivism is demanding rather than sceptical:

* Treat measurements as produced evidence, with a history and a method.
* State the assumptions that connect observations to a conclusion.
* Search for counterevidence and make serious alternatives compete.
* Invite criticism from people who do not share every background assumption.
* Revise claims, categories, and methods when their failures become visible.

Data depends on a worldview, so a change in worldview can change the use and
meaning of existing data. That does not make evidence arbitrary. It makes
context, translation, and error correction part of empirical work.

## Sources

* Phillips, D. C., and Nicholas C. Burbules. [*Postpositivism and Educational
  Research*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/postpositivism-and-educational-research-9780847691227/).
  Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.
* Boyd, Nora Mills, and James Bogen. ["Theory and Observation in
  Science"](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/science-theory-observation/).
  *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2024.
* Bird, Alexander. ["Thomas
  Kuhn"](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/thomas-kuhn/). *The Stanford
  Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2022.
* Longino, Helen E. *Science as Social Knowledge*. Princeton University Press,
  1990\.

## Related ideas

- [Epistemology](https://robbiepalmer.me/ideas/epistemology.md): How we know what we claim to know, what justifies a belief, and when new evidence should change it.
- [Falsifiability](https://robbiepalmer.me/ideas/falsifiability.md): A claim is falsifiable when some possible observation could count against it, though real tests examine a bundle of assumptions.
- [Incommensurability](https://robbiepalmer.me/ideas/incommensurability.md): Rival frameworks may lack a complete common measure because their concepts, problems, or standards differ.
- [Paradigm shift](https://robbiepalmer.me/ideas/paradigm-shift.md): A scientific community can replace the shared examples, standards, and concepts that organise its normal work.
- [Theory-ladenness](https://robbiepalmer.me/ideas/theory-ladenness.md): Observations depend on prior ideas about what to notice, how to measure it, and what the result means.

## Where it appears

- Blog post: [The Philosophy of Data Science](https://robbiepalmer.me/blog/2022-03-02-the-philosophy-of-data-science.md)

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